The National Catholic Review

The unexpectedly rapid fall of the house of Qaddafi has given many in the media an opportunity to speculate on whether the rebel victory constitutes a political “win” for Obama. His controversial decision to involve U.S. forces in the campaign to oust the colonel six months ago was much derided by Republican critics as simultaneously too much and too little. While some House Republicans pondered impeachment of the president for violations of the War Powers Act and voted in June to rebuke the administration, accusing the president of not providing a “compelling rationale” for the Libyan operation, Arizona Republican John McCain was advocating a greater U.S. role in the air campaign over Libya and suggesting House Republicans were meddling.

The demise of the Qaddafi regime may or may not polish Obama’s presidential image—November 2012 is a long way off, let’s recall—but it will certainly have an affect on how nations view multilateral actions and the still coalescing international doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect. Multilateralism, abandoned by Bush when Iraq became a target in the war on terror, may be restored by Libya. The patience and effort to put together a real coalition not only saved U.S. face and finance, it spread the risk and the burden of the use of force in a manner that was deemed acceptable to all parties.

And the notion of the responsibility to protect endured its first significant test in the skies over Tripoli. Endorsed by major powers, including the United States, at a UN World Summit in 2005, it is far from an accepted doctrine among politicians and policymakers within national borders. “R2P,” the proposition that outside states have an obligation to intervene when another state engages in genocide or assorted crimes against humanity within its own borders, has grown in recent years out of abject failures to intervene when defenseless people were threatened by their own governments in Iraq, Rwanda, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Qaddafi’s presumed inclination to reduce Benghazi to the stone age was part of the justification for the U.S./NATO intervention, ostensibly against targets which threatened civilians. It was pretty clear from the beginning, however, that Europe’s intention was to put an end to the 42 year reign of Qaddafi, particularly as his son seemed set to follow him into the family business. (Preventing waves of North Africans from washing ashore in southern Europe to escape the mayhem was undoubtedly an unspoken driver in NATO’s determination.)

The success of the doctrine in Libya, if it can be characterized as such, presents two dangers. The air campaign was costly and hazardous both to service members put in harm’s way and to the reputations of politicians and republics alike which participated. The outcome in Libya was and remains far from certain: it is no longer in danger of being Syria but will it be Iraq or Turkey? Only time and the willingness of UN/US/Europeans to involve themselves in North African nation building can tell. The NATO great powers that agreed to the Libya intervention may still come to regret their participation despite today’s apparent victory in Tripoli if the new state lurches dangerously in the future. The air campaign also took siginifcatly longer than anticipated; many were hoping for a quick Qaddafian collapse. He proved more durable than expected, but so too did NATO's ad hoc Libyan coalition. Still the length contributed both to the expense of the campaign and to the risk of the intervention proving ugly and diplomatically damaging. Such considerations may be cause for a retreat from the obligations of R2P when the next humanitarian crisis arises: that's one danger.

A related danger is that success may prove intoxicating to some, who may rush into the next intervention without properly assessing the risks and possible outcomes. Or they may come to see R2P as an international obligation merely or most effectively met through the use of force. R2P may still be served, and served best, via diplomatic persuasion and economic pressure. Early, non-military efforts aimed at preventing the crisis that would require an inevitably controversial use of force, R2P advocates argue, remains the preferred proactive course of nonlethal action.

None of these concerns can reduce easily to bumper-sticker length this election season, but let’s hope they are being pondered in Washington as this “victory” is evaluated in the future.

Comments

Gabriel Marcella | 8/25/2011 - 12:00pm
Kevin,
The norm of responsibility to protect is likely to get a boost from the Libyan experience. Nonetheless it faces a rocky road in the future for the reasons you indicate. But that's the nature of international relations: states will do what's in their perceived best interests, and effective within their capabilities.

After procrastinating, the Obama administration did the right thing, turning much of the burden over to NATO, and not hastily supporting the Benghazi based authority. This allowed international consensus to build, at the same time that US commitments and military capabilities were stretched thin. Other nations could take the lead and the risks. The Libya commitment is also salutary for the future credibility of NATO, some of whose members are reluctant to take on defense responsibilities. One of the lessons for the future of RP2 is that little will be done unless the US is either in the lead or provides strong support.

To say that this was about oil is incorrect. Libyan oil and gas production was already fully integrated into the international market. Hugo Chavez and his ilk have no credibility when they accuse NATO of going after Libya's oil.
Anonymous | 8/24/2011 - 9:48pm
It will be interesting to see what happens.  This always was about oil.  There are 7 million people in this fairly large country and they export in good times a million barrels a day.  That means this generates every 7 day about $75 per person.  They also have $100 billion frozen in foreign exchanges or about $14 thousand a person.


They are well off and we will see who tries to get this money and what they do with it.  They are all Sunni, no Al Qaeda yet and not real big hostilities between tribes.  Maybe it will become a tourist haven and we can all see those Roman ruins that dot North Africa.


Oh, there is the nuclear material and large weapons caches that exist and I wonder what will become of this. 


Did Obama do anything here?  I know he will claim something but what did he really do.  He did allocate some resource to a kinetic military action I believe. 
Liam Richardson | 8/24/2011 - 7:09pm
And it was still unconstitutional. The National Security State that began under the Truman Administration has in the past decade also proven itself unsustainable. 
ed gleason | 8/24/2011 - 5:55pm
Obama should be getting an A for getting allies to do most of the heavy lifting in Libya. Now how about getting the Swiss into the act by getting/setting Libya on a democratic path. Six million Libyans; seven million Swiss; Libya has oil. Swiss none. Libya has tribes; Swiss have Germans, French and Italians. [tribes may be easier]]. How do we get the Swiss to send  teams /delegations of government advisors to Libya?? Scandinavians should be on the team also. NO AMERICANS PLEASE.