The apparent deployment of remotely detonated explosive devices in pagers and two-way radios used by Hezbollah members in Lebanon has raised concerns over the ethics and legality of the tactic, particularly given the civilian casualties among Lebanese resulting from these explosions. No party has claimed credit for the pager attack, but Hezbollah blames Israel, and U.S. officials on background have said that Israeli intelligence intercepted a shipment of pagers and inserted explosives into them.
America had the chance to interview two experts on military ethics and just war teaching in one household: Maryann Cusimano Love, associate professor of International Relations at the Catholic University of America; and Richard A. Love, a professor in the College of Information and Cyberspace at National Defense University. Dr. Cusimano Love’s comments were provided via email. These interviews have been edited for length and clarity.
Do the pager attacks conform to international law?
Maryann Cusimano Love: Israel has a right to self defense, and civilians have a right to protection. Israel’s self defense actions are limited by ethics and law. After suffering a horrific terrorist attack, there is pressure to “respond in kind.” Many argue that since terrorists fight dirty, the “gloves should come off” in response.
This approach is self-defeating. You can’t argue that terrorism is wrong, that killing civilians in terrorist attacks is immoral, illegal, and that the world should come together against terrorism, while engaging in attacks that kill civilians.
Richard Love: We’re talking about a state attacking a terrorist organization, which is a non-state actor, but these attacks are occurring within defined countries, Syria and Lebanon. In July, Israel also assassinated Hezbollah leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iran. The question is whether it would be legitimate for those countries to respond with an armed attack against Israel. Under international law, all three of those states would be justified in some sort of response.
Hezbollah is a designated terrorist organization by the United States and many other states, but Israel and Lebanon are signatories to the 1983 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which bans remotely delivered mines. Many academics include booby traps in this definition, which arguably makes Israel’s use of explosives in pagers and walkie-talkies illegal.
But perhaps the most concerning aspect of the attack was in how it was targeted, since non-combatants were certainly injured in great numbers and some noncombatants were killed. A fundamental tenet of humanitarian law rests on distinction, the requirement to distinguish combatants from non-combatants and not target non-combatants with military assets.
How would U.S. Army regulations have applied to these attacks? Would they have been prohibited?
MCL: After the September 11 attacks, the United States faced similar questions in assessing how to respond. These are challenges governments face in conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. The U.S. general who was in charge of the war in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, repeatedly noted that “every civilian death diminishes our cause,” and “you can’t kill your way out” of this conflict.
RL: If the United States were engaged in a conflict with a state adversary, an attack like this would raise a lot of questions about whether this was a targeted assassination. By policy, the United States prohibits the assassination of political leaders in a country with which we are not at war. Whether you assassinate a political leader in times of war is largely a matter of politics because once you do that, you open your side to reprisals.
However, against a non-state actor, I can foresee that the U.S. military would view an attack like this similarly to a drone strike, which the United States has in the past legitimized by saying, 1) they’re non-state actors, and 2) they’re terrorists.
Is the use of these pagers and walkie-talkies an indiscriminate attack on civilians? Were civilians hurt? Israel will say that the people who had these devices were Hezbollah terrorists funded by Iran, but there’s no guarantee that these devices, once put out there, could not get into the hands of noncombatants. The same would apply if the U.S. were to use such a stratagem to attack adversaries; they would be culpable if civilians were collateral damage here—if they were injured or killed. So it’s a very, very difficult situation.
Israel or any force in the future may find ways to justify using this tactic, but it’s a dangerous precedent. You can see how this could easily be characterized as an indiscriminate attack that could potentially injure civilians.
Is the Biden administration implicated in the attacks?
RL: It’s clear that the Biden administration wasn’t involved in the attacks and that the attacks weren’t coordinated with the United States. It’s likely that the United States was given a 10 to 15 minute heads-up that this was going to happen, but Israel did not tip off the administration with enough time for them to do anything about it.
How might the Catholic tradition of just war theory be applied to this case?
MCL: Just war tradition is necessary, but insufficient, in describing the ethical terrain. Just war tradition is institutionalized in the Geneva Conventions, in international law of war and in domestic codes of military justice. The tradition requires the right intention of seeking a positive peace, rather than revenge, but it also requires positive actions to protect noncombatants, the criteria of discrimination and proportionality.
Israel and Hezbollah have been fighting since the 1980s. It’s time for new approaches, for using the principles and practices of Just Peace, which have helped to cool other decades-long conflicts around the world.
The I.D.F. has claimed to be practicing a strategy of “de-escalation through escalation.” How do you think these pager explosions factor into that strategy? Is the strategy viable?
RL: The Biden administration has spent a lot of time and energy trying to get the two parties to negotiate an end to this conflict, so when Israelis say, “escalate to de-escalate,” they’re signaling to the Biden administration that they’re trying to get to the table. But I don’t see any evidence of that happening. All the evidence that I’ve laid out points to an escalation that’s not going to de-escalate. There is a real fear within Washington that this thing could get out of control.
Israel has an unstated policy of “escalation dominance.” At the top of the escalation ladder, Israel has nuclear weapons and Iran doesn’t. As of today, Israel holds the cards. Iran is pre-nuclear—but who knows how long that situation will last?
I suspect there’s a lot of pressure within Israel to use this dominance while they still have it. We’ve seen this play out in Gaza, where I don’t believe anyone believed that the I.DF. was going to bulldoze and blow up the entire Gaza Strip before they did it. Where we are now, as far as the humanitarian crisis and catastrophe Gaza has become is almost unbelievable.
It’s also hard to believe that Israeli leaders really have any concern for collateral damage. They appear to be trying to solve the Hamas problem with overwhelming military strength. That should also be a signal to what might be coming for Hezbollah.
The problem is confronting Hezbollah is a far more risky proposition. It is a far more savvy adversary; it’s funded and armed by Iran and Hezbollah will be a much more difficult target. You’re not just going into the Gaza Strip; this would require an invasion of Lebanon, and you can draw on the history of how that’s played out in the past. It’s been very risky, it’s been very bloody, and it’s always resulted in an indeterminate outcome.
What are Israel’s strategic goals at this time and its larger goals going forward?
RL: One goal is to return the Israeli residents who have been displaced from the Hezbollah strikes. You’ve got tens of thousands of Israelis who had to evacuate. What is justifying these targeted strikes against Hezbollah? It’s so these residents can return and no longer face the threat of rockets killing them in Israel.
But is the Israeli strategic objective here to make Hezbollah incapable of delivering their missile strikes? Part of that would be to look at what they’ve done: on Sept. 17, they went after pagers; on Sept. 18, walkie-talkies; on Sept. 20, you have airstrikes. Are they preparing the battlespace for an invasion? Is their strategic goal to go in and conduct operations similar to what they’re doing in Gaza? Because I’m here to tell you: that is very risky. Every time the I.D.F. has tried a ground invasion in Lebanon, they’ve gotten mired down and were not able to achieve their strategic objectives.
I don’t know what their final goals are here. It could be to get to the negotiating table with the most strength possible, but it sure looks like they’re prepping the battlefield for an invasion. If you’re Israel, you don’t want your adversary to know which of the two you’re doing.
But an invasion would be catastrophic both for the people of Lebanon, for the people of Israel who are fighting a hidden organization which has vastly greater capabilities than Hamas. So don’t fall under the illusion that the next step for Israel is just to replicate what they did in the Gaza Strip. It will be a far greater, bloodier and riskier campaign.
Who’s standing behind Hezbollah? Iran.
And who’s standing behind Iran? Russia.
